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MANSMANN,  Circuit Judge. 
         Hartford Accident & Indemnity Company appeals from a 
decision of the U.S. District Court of the Virgin Islands, Division 
of St. Thomas and St. John, awarding Gwen S. Sharp prejudgment 
interest on the payment of the proceeds of an accidental death and 
dismemberment policy of which her husband, Laverne J. Sharp, was 
the insured.  Mrs. Sharp was the only beneficiary under the policy.  
 
         The sole issue we address in this appeal is whether the 
award of prejudgment interest as set forth in Title 22 V.I.C.  
228(b) ("insured" entitled to prejudgment interest from the date of 
loss to the date of judgment as compensation for delay in payment) 
applies to beneficiaries of life insurance policies and not 
exclusively to "the insured" as set forth in the statute. 
         We hold that since this statute states clearly on its 
face that an "insured" may recover the interest, the additional 
benefit is not available to one who is not an insured.  Instead, we 
apply Title 11 V.I.C.  951(a)(4) and award to Mrs. Sharp, as a 
beneficiary who was forced to litigate to recover the proceeds of 
a life insurance policy, prejudgment interest from the date of the 
proof of loss to December 16, 1992, the date the money was 
deposited with the court.   
 
 
                                I. 
         Laverne Sharp obtained an accidental death and 
dismemberment policy from Hartford effective July 1, 1984, with a 
maximum coverage amount of $150,000.00 for loss of life.  
Subsequent to the effective date of the policy, on May 8, 1990, Mr. 
Sharp died of a gunshot wound to the head.  It was conceded by 
Hartford at oral argument before us that per the terms and 
conditions of the policy, on May 26, 1990, Mrs. Sharp forwarded to 
Hartford a copy of Mr. Sharp's death certificate which listed his 
cause of death as a homicide, requesting that a $150,000 payment be 
made to her as sole beneficiary.  Hartford did not respond but 
approximately two and one-half years later, it filed a federal 
complaint for interpleader and declaratory relief, depositing 
$150,000.00 with the court pending the outcome of the matter.  Mrs. 
Sharp, the only replying party, filed an answer and a counterclaim 
for the insurance proceeds and prejudgment interest and a second 
counterclaim for postjudgment interest and bad faith.  On June 11, 
1993, a United States Magistrate Judge ordered the release of the 
funds to Mrs. Sharp. 
         Subsequently Mrs. Sharp filed a motion for partial 
summary judgment for prejudgment interest pursuant to Title 22 
V.I.C.  228.  Hartford, in turn, filed a cross-motion for partial 
summary judgment, asserting that Mrs. Sharp was not entitled to 
prejudgment interest as she was a beneficiary and not the actual 
"insured" as the statute requires.  The district court denied 
Hartford's motion and granted Mrs. Sharp's motion for partial 
summary judgment, holding that Title 22 V.I.C.  228(b) reflected 
a legislative intent to award prejudgment interest to an insured 
forced to litigate entitlement to recovery under an insurance 
policy and that the same rationale applies to a beneficiary. 
         The district court had jurisdiction pursuant to 48 U.S.C. 
 1612(a) and Title 4 V.I.C.  32.  We have jurisdiction pursuant 
to 28 U.S.C.  1291.  Since we are reviewing the interpretation of 
a statute by the district court, our review is plenary.  United 
Industrial Workers Service v. Government of the Virgin Islands, 987 
F.2d 162, 167 (3d Cir. 1993). 
 
                               II. 
         Section 228 of Title 22 of the Virgin Islands Code 
mandates that: 
          228.  Payment of claims 
              (a)  Effective 90 days after February 24, 1984, 
         insurance companies doing business in the Virgin Islands 
         shall have thirty (30) calendar days from the date on 
         which an agreement to settle is signed or a proof of 
         claims has been filed, whichever comes last, to make 
         payment of all sums due under an insurance policy. 
 
              (b)  In cases where suit is brought by the insured 
         to recover the payment due under the policy, interest at 
         the prevailing prime rate applicable on the date of 
         judgment, under section 951 of Title 11, Virgin Islands 
         Code, from the date of loss to the date of judgment, 
         shall be added to the amount of the judgment so as to 
         compensate the insured for delay in payment. . . . 
 
 
Thus, if an "insured" is required to litigate its entitlement to 
proceeds for a policy covered under this Title, section 228 would 
authorize prejudgment interest from the date of the loss covered 
under the policy to the date of judgment.   
         In determining whether this statute also applies to one 
not an insured, we are guided by well-settled principles of 
statutory construction.   
         We begin with the familiar canon of statutory 
         construction that the starting point for 
         interpreting a statute is the language of the 
         statute itself.  Absent a clearly expressed 
         legislative intention to the contrary, that 
         language must ordinarily be regarded as 
         conclusive.   
 
Smith v. Fidelity Consumer Discount Co., 898 F.2d 907, 909-910 (3d 
Cir. 1989) (quoting Consumer Product Safety Commission v. GTE 
Sylvania, Inc., 447 U.S. 102, 108 (1980)). 
         Here the language of section 228 is clear -- the 
"insured" is entitled to pre-judgment interest.  Nothing in the 
section indicates that the beneficiary is to be included or stands 
in the shoes of the insured.  Utilizing the statutory Rules of 
Construction for the Virgin Islands, we must read:  
         [w]ords and phrases . . . with their context 
         and ... construed according to the common and 
         approved usage of the English language.  
         Technical words and phrases, and such others 
         as may have acquired a peculiar and 
         appropriate meaning in the law, shall be 
         construed and understood according to their 
         peculiar and appropriate meaning. 
 
V.I. Code Ann. tit. 1,  42 (1921). 
         Whether we utilize "the common and approved usage" or its 
"peculiar and appropriate meaning in the law," the word "insured" 
does not include the person whom the insured designates as the 
beneficiary. 
         We have also examined the other provisions of the 
statute, following Judge Maris' cautionary instruction that "all 
the provisions of a statute upon a subject are to be harmonized and 
read together so as to effectuate the purposes of the statute."  
Port Construction Co. v. Government of the Virgin Islands, 359 F.2d 
663, 665 (3d Cir. 1966).  Section 228 is contained in Title 22, 
Chapter 9 of the Virgin Islands Code.  Title 22 discusses 
"Insurance"; Chapter 9 specifically addresses "Insurers; General 
Requirements."  Several sections within Title 22 address the rights 
of a beneficiary.  See 22 V.I.C.  836 (payment of proceeds of life 
insurance or accidental death policies upon simultaneous death of 
insured and beneficiary); 22 V.I.C.  658 (information required on 
a change of beneficiary form under a life or endowment policy or 
annuity contract and payment of funds owing to a beneficiary under 
life insurance policies); 22 V.I.C.  838 (exemption of life 
insurance proceeds paid to the lawful beneficiary of a life 
insurance policy from creditors and representatives of the 
insured); 22 V.I.C.  841 (designation of a beneficiary by the 
spouse of an insured under a life insurance policy); 22 V.I.C.  
1015 (designation of a beneficiary by the insured and endorsement 
of the beneficiary by the insurer on the policy.)  Since in those 
sections the Virgin Islands Legislature utilized the word 
"beneficiary" when it so meant, we can presume that the 
Legislature, familiar with the distinction between the terms, chose 
to use insured -- and only insured -- in section 228.  Cf. Desvi, 
Inc. v. Continental Insurance Company, 968 F.2d 307 (3d Cir. 1992) 
(plain meaning of  228(b) is that interest is mandated on claims 
only when insureds are required to secure judgments in order to 
recover payment). 
         Therefore, we will not create an ambiguity where none 
currently exists and will regard the language of Title 22 V.I.C.  
228 as conclusive.  As in Desvi, Inc., we "need go no further than 
the language of subsection 228(b).  `There is no need to resort to 
legislative history unless the statutory language is ambiguous.'  
Velis v. Kardanis, 949 F.2d 78, 81 (3d Cir. 1991)."  Id. at 309.   
         Mrs. Sharp has not suggested any legislative history to 
the contrary and we have not been able to find any support for her 
position.  Since the statutory language here is clear and plain, we 
must give it effect unless the legislative history is such that a 
literal reading "will produce a result demonstrably at odds with 
the intention of [the] drafters."  Smith, 898 F.2d at 910 (quotingGriffin 
v. Oceanic Contractors, Inc., 458 U.S. 564, 570 (1982)). 
 
                               III. 
         Mrs. Sharp is not, however, without a remedy in her quest 
for prejudgment interest.  Title 11 V.I.C.  951(a)(4) provides 
that: 
         (a)  The rate of interest shall be nine (9%) 
         per centum per annum on -- 
                             *  *  *                               
              (4)  money due or to become due where 
         there is a contract and no rate is specified. 
 
In the absence of a statute specific to this situation, i.e., 
section 228, application of a general statute, i.e., section 951, 
is appropriate.  The Territorial Court of the Virgin Islands, 
Division of St. Thomas and St. John, held in Trocki v. Mendoza, 15 
V.I. 256, 259 (Terr. Ct. 1978) that "[p]ursuant to the Restatement 
of Contracts  337(b)(1932) interest may be awarded at the 
statutory legal rate 'in the discretion of the court if justice 
requires it.'"  In turn, we held more specifically in Benefit Trust 
Life Insurance Company v. Union National Bank of Pittsburgh, 776 
F.2d 1174, 1179 (3d Cir. 1985), that the entitlement to prejudgment 
interest in insurance claims does not differ from that awarded in 
other contractual disputes. 
         Therefore, Gwen Sharp is entitled to prejudgment interest 
pursuant to section 951(a)(4).  The practical effect is that unlike 
section 228 in which the prejudgment interest is calculated from 
the actual date of loss, i.e., May 8, 1990 - the date of death of 
Laverne L. Sharp, prejudgment interest pursuant to section 951 is 
calculated from the date when the insurance proceeds became 
payable, i.e., May 26, 1990 - the date Mrs. Sharp filed a notice of 
claim with Hartford, running until the date Hartford deposited the 
funds into the district court's Registry - December 16, 1992.  
Atlin v. Security Connecticut Life Ins. Co., 788 F.2d 139, 142 (3d 
Cir. 1986) (no interest runs against the stakeholder after he pays 
the disputed sum into court.)   
                               IV. 
         Accordingly, we will vacate the judgment of the district 
court and remand this matter for the entry of a judgment for 
prejudgment interest pursuant to section 951.  
         Each party to bear its own costs. 
 
 
_________________________ 
